

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-07 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-02 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /100 W

----- 100865

P R 171710Z JUL 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1136

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INFO USMISSION NATO

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: STRULAK PRESS CONFERENCE OF JULY 17, 1975

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: POLISH REPRESENTATIVE STRULAK HELD WARSAW
PACT END-OF-ROUND PRESS CONFERENCE BEFORE APPROXIMATELY
20 MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES. TEXT OF STATEMENT FOLLOWS.
IT CONTAINS STANDARD EASTERN OBJECTIONS TO SO-CALLED WESTERN
IMMOBILITY AT TALKS. ADDRESSING THREE "BASIC ISSUES"
OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, STRULAK -- ECHOING KHLESTOV'S
PLENARY STATEMENT (SEPTEL) -- CLAIMED WESTERN POSITION ON
REDUCTIONS BY NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD
"HARDENED" IN THIS ROUND AND SAID WESTERN POSITION ON THIS
ISSUE WAS ONE OF THE MAJOR OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS IN
VIENNA. STRULAK SAID WESTERN STAND AGAINST REDUCTION
OF AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS FURTHER OBSTACLE
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TO PROGRESS.

2. STRULAK INCLUDED DISCUSSION OF FORCE DEFINITIONS AS "ANOTHER INITIATIVE" OF WARSAW PACT IN THIS ROUND. AS A RESULT, MAJORITY OF QUESTIONS ASKED BY MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES FOCUSED ON REASON, PURPOSE, AND CONTENT OF THIS "INITIATIVE." RESPONDING, STRULAK RESORTED TO CONSTANT EVASIONS. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. I WOULD BEGIN THE EVALUATION OF THE VI ROUND OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WITH A GENERAL CONCLUSION THAT THE 19 PARTICIPATING NATIONS HAVE IN THIS ROUND ENERGETICALLY CONTINUED THE DEBATES ON THE IMPORTANT ISSUES CONCERNING A FUTURE AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ALTHOUGH THE DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH TO BASIC QUESTIONS AND EVEN PROCEDURAL ONES, WHICH WE HAVE OFTEN ENCOUNTERED IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, STILL DIVIDE US, MUCH EFFORT HAS AGAIN BEEN MADE TO CLARIFY THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS.

2. THIS WORK HAS CONTINUOUSLY BEEN CARRIED ON IN GOOD ATMOSPHERE, WITH FULL UNDERSTANDING OF OUR RESPONSIBILITIES. AS IN PREVIOUS ROUNDS, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE TRIED TO MAKE USE OF THIS ATMOSPHERE AND FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE WAY TO OVERCOMING DIFFICULTIES AND TO PROGRESS. THEY HAVE COME UP WITH YET ANOTHER INITIATIVE DIRECTED TOWARD THIS AIM.

3. I SHOULD LIKE FIRST TO REVIEW SOME GENERAL ISSUES WHICH STILL CREATE DIFFICULTIES, BEING THE MAIN CAUSE OF THE LACK OF PROGRESS.

4. THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS IS KNOWN TO ALL WHO ARE FAMILIAR, AS YOU ARE, WITH THE DRAFT AGREEMENT FOR AN OVER 15 PERCENT REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE 1975-77 PERIOD. OUR NEGOTIATING PLATFORM FURTHER INCLUDES PROPOSAL FOR A "FIRST STEP" REDUCTION IN 1975 AMOUNTING TO 40 THOUSAND SOLDIERS AND THEIR EQUIPMENT AND EMBRACING ARMED FORCES OF ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF THESE TALKS. SUBSEQUENTLY WE OFFERED AMENDMENTS TO OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT SUGGESTING TO PRECEDE THE GENERAL REDUCTIONS

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WITH THOSE OF THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE AGREED AREA BOTH IN 1975 AND 1976. MOREOVER, WE STILL MAINTAIN THE PROPOSAL FOR THE JOINT DECLARATION BY THE ELEVEN STATES, DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, NOT TO INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHILE THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED WITH THE INTENTION TO WORK OUT A REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

5. I FIND IT NECESSARY TO RECALL THESE PROPOSALS IN ORDER TO EMPHASIZE THE WIDE RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES OF AN AGREEMENT INDICATED BY THEIR AUTHORITY, THE DELEGATIONS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE SOVIET UNION AND POLAND. THEY ALL CONTAIN EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE COMPLEX PROBLEM OF REDUCING ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE THREE LATEST PROPOSALS WERE MADE WITH A VIEW TO TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION AND THUS FACILITATE AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF A COMPROMISE.

6. HOWEVER, WE CONTINUE TO NOTE CONSTANT REFUSAL ON THE PART OF WESTERN DELEGATIONS TO SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THESE PROPOSALS, TO BUILD UPON THE ELEMENTS OF COMPROMISE IN THEM. FOR A NUMBER OF ROUNDS NOW THERE HAS BEEN NO WESTERN COUNTER PROPOSAL. THERE HAS ONLY BEEN CONTINUED INSISTENCE ON THE ORIGINAL DEMANDS FOR ASYMMETRICAL AND SELECTIVE TWO-PHASED REDUCTIONS, AS INDICATED IN THE "OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS" WHICH ARE CLEARLY MEANT TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY GAINS FOR THE NATO STATES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

7. THE DESIRE OF THE SOCIALIST STATES FOR DE-ESCALATION OF MILITARY CONCENTRATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS OBVIOUS. EQUALLY OBVIOUS AND FAIR IS OUR REQUIREMENT THAT THIS DE-ESCALATION SHOULD PROCEED WITHOUT AN INFRINGEMENT UPON THE EXISTING CORRELATION OF FORCES IN THE AREA, TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTICIPANT IN THE FUTURE AGREEMENT, OF ANY NEGOTIATING STATE AND OF EUROPEAN NATION.

8. THE FULFILMENT OF THIS FUNDAMENTAL PREMISE OF ANY SOUND REDUCTION AGREEMENT CANNOT TAKE PLACE WITHOUT MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF THREE BASIC ISSUES TO WHICH MUCH ATTENTION HAS BEEN DEVOTED DURING THIS ROUND:

- WHOSE FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD BE REDUCED

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FROM THE BEGINNING?

- WHAT KINDS OF FORCES SHOULD BE COVERED BY THE REDUCTION?

- WHAT SHOULD BE THE STATUS OF ARMAMENTS UNDER SUCH AGREEMENT?

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SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /100 W

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P R 171710Z JUL 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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9. THE POSITION OF SOCIALIST STATES WITH RESPECT TO THESE BASIC QUESTIONS IS NOT ONLY CLEAR BUT ALSO WELL ANCHORED IN THE MUTUALLY AGREED PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS OF JUNE 28, 1973.

10. SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS STAND FOR EQUAL AND MUTUAL CHARACTER OF OBLIGATIONS. THEREFORE, IN THE FIRST PLACE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROCESS OF REDUCTION SHOULD ENCOMPASS ARMED FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE BEGINNING. IT SHOULD NOT - AS THE WEST POSTULATES - SIMPLY CONCENTRATE ON THE ARMIES OF THE USSR AND THE US WITHIN THE AREA AND OVERLOOK OTHER NATIONAL COMPONENTS OF THE PRESENT MILITARY CONCENTRATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE, SOME OF THEM VERY LARGE NUMERICALLY AND VERY SIGNIFICANT IN RESPECT OF COMBAT POTENTIAL. WERE WE TO CLOSE OUR EYES TO THE FACT THAT IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE REDUCTION AREA IN CENTRAL EUROPE THERE ARE LARGE AND POTENT FORCES, OTHER THAN THOSE OF THE US, AND TO ACCEPT THE WESTERN SCHEME, WE WOULD BE AGREEING TO DIMINISHED SECURITY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA THE GERMAN UNCLASSIFIED

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DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND POLAND IN PARTICULAR, AND OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES IN GENERAL. YOU MAY WELL UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, JUST AS ANY SOVEREIGN COUNTRY CANNOT POSSIBLY ACCEPT SUCH A PROPOSITION, OR HAVE IT ENDORSED IN AN INTERNATIONAL ACCORD.

11. SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DO NOT CLAIM ANY UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES FOR THEMSELVES. THE FOUR SOCIALIST DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ARE ALL PREPARED TO MAKE THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO REDUCTIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, WE DEMAND THAT THE FUTURE REDUCTION AGREEMENT SHOULD SPECIFICALLY COVER FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE OF ELEVEN PARTICIPANTS TO THE VIENNA TALKS. THESE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS OF EACH COUNTRY MUST BE KNOWN BEFORE REDUCTIONS ACTUALLY START. IT IS THE NATURAL RIGHT OF EVERY STATE CONTEMPLATING REDUCTIONS TO KNOW IN ADVANCE HOW MUCH AND WHEN OTHERS WILL REDUCE.

12. BASING OURSELVES ON THIS POSITION OF PRINCIPLE, WE HAVE, HOWEVER, DEMONSTRATED CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY WITH REGARD TO THE SEQUENCE OF REDUCTIONS, TAKING LARGELY INTO ACCOUNT THE WESTERN WISHES. WE HAVE OFFERED COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS, ENSURING THAT IN 1975 AND 1976 THE FORCES OF THE USSR AND THE US IN THE AREA WILL BE REDUCED PRIOR TO OTHER FORCES.

13. WHILE THIS COMPROMISE MOVE OF OURS HAS REMAINED WITHOUT RESPONSE, WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAVE IN THIS ROUND HARDENED THEIR POSITION AND REFUSED TO CONTEMPLATE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATIONS OF THEIR FORCES EVEN FOR A DISTANT FUTURE. THEY KEPT REHEARSING THE IDEA OF COLLECTIVE NATO OBLIGATIONS WHICH WOULD ENABLE INDIVIDUAL WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES UNDER THE SO-CALLED COMMON CEILING AND THUS NULLIFY IN PRACTICE A REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

14. NO WONDER, THIS WESTERN POSITION HAS INCREASINGLY BECOME A MAJOR OBSTACLE ON THE WAY TO AGREEMENT.

15. THE SECOND BASIC ISSUE RELATES TO THE KINDS OF FORCES TO BE REDUCED UNDER A FUTURE AGREEMENT. SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CONSIDER THAT SINGLING OUT GROUND FORCES ALONE FOR THE PURPOSE OF REDUCTION OF THE PRESENT MILITARY CONCENTRATION IN CENTRAL UNCLASSIFIED

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EUROPE IS NOT ONLY INSUFFICIENT, BUT THAT SUCH A STEP WOULD CLEARLY BRING UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES TO THE NATO.

16. THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS HAVE AGAIN IN THE PRESENT ROUND PROVED THE ARTIFICIALITY OF THE THEORIES OF SO-CALLED "DISPARITIES" IN GROUND FORCES, THEORIES WHICH FALSELY BASE THEMSELVES ON SEPARATING JUST ONE ELEMENT FROM THE ACTUALLY VERY COMPLEX CORRELATION OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

17. THE REALITY IN THIS RESPECT IS WELL KNOWN. THE STOCK-PILED NUCLEAR POTENTIAL IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE IS ENORMOUS. THE WEIGHT OF THE EXPANDING MEANS OF MODERN AIR WARFARE IN THE MILITARY POTENTIAL THERE IS ESSENTIAL.

TO EXEMPT THESE FORCES AND ARMAMENTS FROM THE FUTURE REDUCTION AGREEMENT WOULD THUS BE DENYING THE REALITY. IT COULD IN FACT LEAD TO AN ARMAMENTS RACE IN THESE DANGEROUS DOMAINS.

18. THIS VIEW, PARTICULARLY OF THE NEED TO REDUCE AND LIMIT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE AREA, SEEMS TO BE GAINING STRENGTH IN THE WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION JUST AS IT IS STRONGLY MAINTAINED BY THE PEOPLES OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THE REALISATION OF DANGER IS COMMON.

19. HOWEVER, IN SPITE OF THIS, IT MUST BE SAID THAT THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE NOT CHANGED THEIR TOTALLY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE ON THE ISSUE OF THE REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE WESTERN REFUSAL TO INCLUDE INTO REDUCTIONS AIR FORCE AND UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS REMAINS ANOTHER MAJOR OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IN THE TALKS.

20. THE THIRD BASIC ISSUE DISCUSSED IN THE CURRENT ROUND AT SOME DEPTH IS THE STATUS OF ARMAMENTS IN GENERAL, UNDER A FUTURE AGREEMENT. THE POSITION OF SOCIALIST STATES IN THIS RESPECT FULLY CORRESPONDS WITH THE AGREED SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH COMPRISES ARMAMENTS NEXT TO ARMED FORCES TO BE COVERED BY MUTUAL REDUCTIONS.

21. IT IS LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT REDUCTION AND ENSUING LIMITATION OF THIS ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE A GUARANTEE AGAINST THE ARMS RACE, THE BAN WHICH MUST BE A NATURAL GOAL
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OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

22. SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS CANNOT, THEREFORE, BUT BE CRITICAL OF THE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY SOME WESTERN DELEGATIONS THAT A FUTURE REDUCTION PROGRAMME SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF A SIZABLE PORTION OF THE COMBAT EQUIPMENT FROM THE EASTERN PART OF THE REDUCTION AREA WHILE KEEPING INTACT WESTERN ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA AND LEAVING FULLY OPEN FOR NATO PARTICIPANTS THE POSSIBILITY FURTHER TO AMASS TECHNICAL MEANS OF WARFARE.

23. SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS ARE FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT FUTURE REDUCTIONS, TO BE EFFECTIVE, SHOULD LIMIT NOT ONLY THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL OF ARMED FORCES BUT ALSO THEIR ARMS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT.

24. ACCORDINGLY, IN OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT WE PROPOSE THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE TOGETHER WITH ARMAMENTS. ONLY THEN WILL THE PROCESS OF REDUCTION BE MEANINGFUL AND WILL EFFECTIVELY CURB THE POSSIBILITIES OF ARMS RACE IN

CENTRAL EUROPE.

25. I HAVE IN A GENERAL WAY DELINEATED THE DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH ON THE BASIC QUESTIONS WHICH THE NEGOTIATORS HAVE YET TO SOLVE. FROM THIS YOU CAN GATHER THAT WE STILL HAVE A LONG ROAD TO PROCEED BEFORE AN AGREEMENT IS ACHIEVED. HOW QUICKLY WE CAN MOVE ALONG THIS ROAD CLEARLY NOW DEPENDS ON THE WILLINGNESS OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO RECOGNIZE THE OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF MUTUALITY AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF US ALL. AS YOU MAY SEE, WE CAN HARDLY MOVE FORWARD AS LONG AS THE WESTERN STATES ATTEMPT TO RESTRICT ONE SIDE, NAMELY THE SOCIALIST STATES, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME THEY TEND TO SECURE FOR THE NATO OPEN POSSIBILITIES TO IMPROVE ITS MILITARY POSTURE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

26. AN IMPORTANT STAGE OF THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL DETENTE ON OUR CONTINENT IS ABOUT TO CULMINATE IN THE HISTORICAL SUMMIT MEETING IN HELSINKI, WHEN THIS PROCESS WILL BE AFFIRMED AND FURTHER STIMULATED. THE URGENCY TO SUPPLEMENT AND CONSOLIDATE DETENTE THROUGH CONCRETE MEASURES IN MILITARY DOMAIN - WHICH IS OUR SPECIFIC TASK IN VIENNA - IS, NO DOUBT, GROWING.
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AT THIS JUNCTURE THE RECOGNITION OF THE MUTUAL REQUIREMENTS OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AND CONTINUED STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE BECOMES PARTICULARLY ESSENTIAL.

27. THEREFORE, WE FEEL, WE MAY JUSTIFIABLY HOPE FOR A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH OF OUR WESTERN PARTNERS.

28. ON OUR PART, WE HAVE ABUNDANTLY PROVED OUR GOOD WILL AND READINESS TO SEARCH FOR PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE COMPLEX PROBLEM OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS REDUCTION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. I HAVE EARLIER RECALLED A SERIES OF OUR PREVIOUS AND STILL VALID PROPOSALS AND ALLUDED TO A NEW ONE IN THIS ROUND. WITHOUT GOING - FOR THE KNOWN REASONS - INTO ANY DETAIL, I SHOULD LIKE TO TELL YOU THAT GUIDED BY THE DESIRE TO FACILITATE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS HAVE AGAIN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT CONSIDERATIONS VOICED BY THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES AND SUGGESTED TO WORK OUT AN AGREED DEFINITION OF WHAT FORCES SHOULD, FOR THE PURPOSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, BE INCLUDED IN GROUND FORCES AND IN AIR FORCES. THIS CONCRETE QUESTION IS OF PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE AND THE DISCUSSION ON IT, WHICH WE CONSIDER USEFUL, SHALL BE CONTINUED. END TEXT.RESOR

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, PRESS CONFERENCES, MILITARY AGREEMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 17 JUL 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975MBFRV00372
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750247-1027
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750747/aaaabpxs.tel
Line Count: 380
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: hartledg
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 FEB 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <28 FEB 2003 by ThomasVJ>; APPROVED <23 MAR 2004 by hartledg>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: STRULAK PRESS CONFERENCE OF JULY 17, 1975
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR, (STRULAK)
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006